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I 
! lN THE SUPREME COURT 
;oF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I 
DEPUTY SHERIFFS MUTUAL AID 
i ASSOCIATION OF SALT LAKE 
I cnUNTY, a Utah nonprofit Corpora-
l tion, and PARLEY W. BLIGHT, 
! Plaintiffs amd Respodnents, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY DEPUTY 
SIIERIFFS MERIT SYSTEM COM-
llISSION and FRANK W. PENNOCK, 
· JOSEPH MAZURAN and LESLIE B. 
\\'HITE, M.D., members of said Com-
i mi,sion, 
I Defenda1its and Appellants. 
Case No. 
11856 
BRIEF O·F AP·PELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for declaratory relief brought by 
!lie individually named plaintiff as a citizen and deputy 
sheriff in Salt Lake County and by the Deputy Sheriffs 
llntual Aid Association of Salt Lake County, a non-
J'l'ufit eorporation on behalf of its members who here-
ittcr will be collectively ref erred to as respondents, 
1 
seeking an Order of the Third District Court to compel 
the defendant, Deputy Sheriffs Merit System Commis-
sion and the individually named defendants who are the 
three commissioners comprising said commission, here. 
after collectively referred to as appellants, to furnish 
certain ''registers'' to respondents for their inspection. 
(R. 1-4). 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
Following responsive pleadings (R. 5 & 6) a Request 
for Admissions (R. 7 &8) and Response thereto (R. 15 & 
16) respondents moved for Judgment on the Pleadings 
on the ground that the issue was largely a matter of 
law (R. 13 & 14). The Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings was heard before the Honorable Merrill ('. 
Faux on July 10, 1969, and the Motion was on the 12th 
of August, 1969, denied (R. 19 & R. 31). Subsequently, 
the matter having been placed on the regular trial 
calendar, was reheard and reargued before the Honor-
able Aldon J. Anderson on September 26, 1969, and 
Judge Anderson Ordered on September 29, 1969, the 
appellants to produce the registers for inspection and 
on the same day issued a Writ of Mandamus (R. 
through 24 and R. 34). On the 2nd of October, 1969, 
appellants filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court (R.17). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek by this appeal to clarify the in-
consistent rulings of the two District Judges note<l 
t. re above on the ground that the registers in ques wn a 
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uot "public documents." That was a view Judge Faux 
:ook. Judge Anderson, on the other hand, considered 
them to be public documents and Ordered their disclo-
: ,ure. Appellants maintain the latter rule, which con-
, stituted judgment in the case on its merits, was error 
! and should be reversed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since as noted above this matter was largely an 
' of law rather than facts, no evidence was taken 
hefore the Court below. The only facts, therefore, in 
!be record are embodied in the Response to the Request 
for Admissions furnished and verified by appellants in 
response to respondents' Request. (R. 15 & 16) 
ARGUMENT 
Appellants submit that the registers in question are 
not public documents open to the citizenry for inspection 
for at least three specific reasons. At the outset, how-
. erer, a foundational look at the Merit System Act, Chap-
kr 30, Title 17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is neces-
'ary. The law was adopted as an initiative measure 
voted by the citizenry and formally adopted November 
8, 1960, its over-riding purpose being to remove from 
1 
political patronage the appointment and promotion of 
ileputy sheriffs in each of the State's 29 counties by 
creating commissions whose duties are, among others, 
11» competitive examination to create a qualified list of 
candidates for the office of deputy sheriff as well as 
lists for promotion within the sheriff's department on 
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a basis of merit. Said lists are referred to in the Statute 
as ''registers.'' There are two types : ''eligible regis. 
ters" ( 17-30-9) and "promotional registers" (17-30-12). 
The eligible register is a list of candidates for the office 
of deputy sheriff. The promotional registers are a list 
of candidates eligible for promotion to sergeant, lieuten-
ant or captain within the department as the case may 
be. 
Section 17-30-10 requires that the sheriff, as a 1·a-
cancy occurs, request from the Merit System Commis-
sion the names of the highest three candidates presently 
appearing on the eligible register from which the sheriff 
or "appointing authority" shall select one of those 
certified. 
Section 17-30-12 ( 3) requires that certification from 
promotional registers shall be made ''in the same man 
ner'' as appointment from an eligible register. The ap-
pointing process, therefore, is the same for all registers. 
Registers pursuant to the terms of 17-30-6, 7, 8 and 
12, are prepared pursuant to the giving of competitive 
exams with these distinctions: Examinations for can-
didates who wish to qualify for the eligible register for 
the office of deputy sheriff take an open competitirc 
examination which is advertised and open to the public: 
Candidates for promotion are also given a competitive 
exam but said exam is only open to merit system officers. 
The commission has, by its rules and regulations, 
required a three year in-rank additional qualification. 
The promotional register and exam further differ' 
from the eligible register exam in that the candidate's 
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sl':iiorii.\' and "service rating" are added to the exam 
re,ults. (17-30-12 (2) ). 
Section 17 -30-8 provides m part ''examination 
papers shall not be open to piiblic inspection without 
i·nurt order, but an applicant may inspect his own papers 
at auy time within 30 days after the mailing of notice 
,,f his grade." (Emphasis added) Clearly therefore the 
l'xaminations themselves are not "public documents." 
In the lower court respondents relied on provisions 
of Section 78-26-1 and 2 which describe "public docu-
ments" and provide "every citizen" has a right to in-
;peet and copy any public writings. In addition, re-
·pondents cited the case of Conover et al. vs. Board of 
i:1l11cation of Nebo School District et al., 1 Utah 2d 375, 
Pacific 2nd 768 (1954). That case construed the 
. :d101 e two noted sections of our code. It is to be borne 
. in mind, however, that the Conover case dealt with un-
trnnscribed minutes made by the secretary of the Board 
11f of Nebo School District. The issue in that 
ease was not whether said minutes were or were not 
'public documents'' nor with whether the meetings of 
! the board were properly public meetings open 
i to the citizenry, but rather at what stage such minutes 
j liecarne public documents. That is, plaintiffs in that 
:ittion wisheJ to inspect the untranscribed minutes of 
ihe board before they had been subsequently presented 
for approval and adopted formally by the board. All 
Parties conceded that such minutes were indeed public 
'hol'cls or public documents. That ruling accordingly, 
'llot directly in point here. 
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There is some language, however, in the Conouer 
case which does shed light on our present controversv. 
Speaking for the Court Justice Henriod observed: · 
"It would seem that, unless matters were of 
such delicate nature or of the type where public 
policy dictates non-dissemination, the meeting it. 
self should be open to the public and press and 
information concerning what transpired 
should be made available at least in a general 
way, to both at any time thereafter, by him 
duty requires its recordation.'' (Emphasis added) 
In that instance the court was discussing the pro. 
ceedings in a public meeting, but suggested that public 
policy might in a given instance suggest or dictate "non. 
dissemination.'' 
As the first of the three arguments appellants wiAh 
to forward in support of their position that the register' 
in question were not properly ordered to be made public, 
it is submitted that the information from which the 
registers are prepared, i.e. competitive examinations are 
statutorily declared not to be open to public inspectioll 
as provided in Section 17-30-8 as noted above. As it 
relates to the eligibility register for new deputies the 
competitive examination results directly dictate arnl 
provide the order in which the eligible register for neir 
deputies is to be composed. With regard to the promo· 
tional registers Section 17-30-12 ( 2) provides in part 
''The combined weights of service rating and seniorit)· 
shall not be more than forty percent of the whole exam· 
ination.'' Which means that the competitive examiJ1a· 
tion with regard to promotional registers comprises at 
6 
least 60% of the information and order from which said 
rrgisters are to be composed. 
8ince the test scores predominantly effect the stand-
!ug on the registers, to make public the register is to 
rcreal comparative success on the examination. The 
actual score is all that would not be made public. 
It would seem therefore almost axiomatic that to 
d!,close the registers would by indirection be making 
public information, which by statute is expressly de-
elared not to be publicly disclosed without court order. 
In that connection the statute has built in it the oppor-
innity for application to court for inspection by any 
ilcpnty or other party thought to be aggrieved in the 
1'xamination and register-composing process. Specifically 
Section 17-30-20 provides : 
''A person aggrieved by an act or failure to 
act of any merit system commission under this 
act may appeal to the district court, if he has ex-
hausted his remedies of appeal to the commission. 
The courts may review questions of law and fact 
and may affirm, set aside or modify the ruling 
complained of.'' 
A California precedent which appellants maintain 
is directly in point here is of some interest. It is the 
vase of City and County of Boo Francisco et. aJ, vs. 
Superior Court in and for the City (J/Y/Jd Cownty of 
Sa11 Francisco 238 Pacific 2nd 581 (1951). California's 
''public records" statute is much the same as Utah's. 
That em;e was a mandamus action brought by a selec-
t!rc group of city employees of the City of San Fran-
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cisco wishing to inspect some records of the City Civil 
Service Commission. By statute the Commission was 
obliged to adopt a wage scale program for use by the 
city. Said scale was to be based upon the Commission's 
findings derived from salaries paid comparable profes-
sions and skills in private industry. In order to get the 
comparable salary information from selected p1irnte 
employers the City Civil Service Commission promised 
confidentiality to said employers regarding informatio11 
received. The court there said in part: 
''In this proceeding we are concerned with 
the question of the propriety of the respondent 
court's exercise of its power in granting the mo-
tion for inspection of the data relating to the 
source of the information agreed to be treated ao 
confidential. There is no conflict in the evidence 
as to the adverse effect of the disclosure on the 
public interest. On the evidence and the law it is 
concluded that the petitioners are entitled to haYe 
the confidential matter deemed privileged under 
Section 1881 ( 5) of the Code of Civil procedure 
and that the respondent court misapplied and 
therefore exceeded its jurisdiction in granting 
the motion for inspection. What may be the re-
lation of the agreements of confidence to the 
alleged cause of action or defense is not a matter 
for consideration at this time. Questions of com-
pliance by the commission and the board of super-
visors with the charter requirements are deemed 
not to be involved in this proceeding. They are 
more properly to be treated with the larger 
presented in the pending mandamus proceedrng. 
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Carter 
adds the following language : 
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"This is an indirect approach for which I 
see no reason. The charter is clear and specifies 
that all the data obtained by the Commission 
shall be set forth in its official records, and it 
should be so held at this time. If it is believed 
that data obtained by a promise of secrecy should 
not be used in this case even though the Commis-
sion had no authority to give such a pledge, the 
more pertinent basis for such is estoppel. That 
is to say, that one giving the information, having 
done so on the assurance that it was confidential, 
may now claim that the city cannot reverse its 
position and betray that confidence. If it thus 
will not be permitted to comply with the law, it 
follows that the wage scale cannot stand, for it 
is not based upon the public record of the data 
obtained. The result is that the scale fixed is 
invalid on that ground alone and the trial court 
should be so advised to guide its decision in the 
mandamus action ... 
"My view is that the city is estopped from 
disclosing the data obtained in confidence, but 
the ordinance fixing the wage scale, which is 
based upon said data, is invalid, and we should 
so hold. However, because of the pledge of se-
crecy the Commission should not be required to 
divulge the information and therefore its order 
to the contrary should be made ineffective by 
prohibition, as is done by the majority opinion." 
In the situation that confronted the court in the 
San Francisco case where in order for a wage scale 
ordinance to be valid "all data" relating to the same 
iras by statute required to be published, even in that 
instance, the court held that where the information was 
on a promise of confidentiality the same should 
not be disclosed, even though as Justice Carter suggested 
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that logically meant the ordinance derived from such 
information would necessarily as well be invalid. 
There is no provision in our Merit Act declaring the 
CommisRion 's records to be public or that "data" from 
which registers are prepared, wage scales determined 
' etc. is open to inspection. 
If public policy prohibits the disclosure, as in 
the San Francisco case, of information in part confi-
dential by virtue of a promise of confidentiality, then 
clearly public policy should more emphatically require 
that a register, whose principle component is statutorily 
declared confidential, should as well remain non-publir. 
As it relates to the case before the bar, there is an 
additional public policy argument that would indicate 
such registers are not public documents. It is indicated in 
the language of Conover vs. Board of Education of Nebo 
School District 110 Utah 454, 175 Pacific 2nd 209. This 
case was an earlier ruling between the same two principle 
parties involved in the citation noted above. In this 
earlier Conover case this court said: 
"It is one of the cardinal rules of construc-
tion that a statute must be construed with ref-
erence to the objects sought to be accomplished 
by it." 
Reading the Merit System Act as a whole one in-
evitably concludes that its purpose is to require the 
hiring and promoting of officers in the sheriff's de-
partment on a basis of merit. Equally permeating the 
statute is the undercurrent that the records of indi-
vidual deputies shall be maintained inviolate and con-
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fidential. In addition to 17-30-8 relating to examinations 
is some interesting language at 17-30-19 which provides 
that upon disciplinary action, demotion, reduction in 
pay, etc., such penalized officers may petition for a hear-
ing by the Merit Commission and continues "if the 
officer so desires, the hearing shall be public, and the 
parties may be represented by counsel," (emphasis add-
ed) indicating that it is the aggrieved officer's discretion 
as to whether or not the hearing shall be public. 
In the same vein, the act provides that the sheriff 
(or "appointing authority") is only permitted to see 
three names from a register at a time. Section 17-30-10 
(1) provides : 
''When a peace officer is to be appointed 
(and parenthetically it is to be emphasized that 
the same procedure applies to promotions, as 
noted above) the appointing authority shall re-
quest the Merit System Commission to certify 
three eligible applicants for the position. The 
Commission shall thereupon certify to the ap-
pointing authority the names of the three appli-
cants standing highest on the eligible register. 
The appointing authority shall select and appoint 
one of the persons so certified.'' 
The last cited section brings us to appellants second 
argument: 
If respondents succeed on appeal and the register 
or registers in question are ruled by this court to be 
1 
Pllhlic and open for any citizens inspection, clearly then 
the sheriff or appointing authority could equally de-
mand and receive not three names of the highest appli-
11 
cants as noted in the above section but each entire reg-
ister. He would then be free to "go shopping" clown 
the list. That is, he could invent reasons for passing 
over men standing higher on the register in order, for 
whatever reasons, political or otherwise, to promote or 
appoint names appearing downstream. This would, of 
course, obviously frustrate the overall intent of the 
statute and would be contrary to the language of the 
earlier Conover case cited above. 
Such a situation is not entirely unlike the present 
practice of the district courts in furnishing jury lists. 
As this court is doubtless aware, the usage in thP Third 
District is for the jury in a given civil or criminal 
case to be selected from the overall panel, usually uot 
more than twelve to eighteen hours before the day of 
trial. Counsel is ordinarily furnished the names of hie 
prospective jurors as of the morning of the trial upon 
arrival in court, finding the list on counsel table. In-
deed, even when a special venire is requested, and the 
appropriate fee paid, such list of potential names in 
that event are generally not selected and furnished 
counsel more than 48 hours or so prior to the day of 
trial. One obvious and salutory result is that counsel 
are not thereby afforded extensive time in which to 
raise objections at the enpaneling of jurors in order to 
get them excused for cause, thereby impending the or-
derly progress of the case load and the trial of cases. 
Given enough time and the names of potential jurors. 
counsel or their investigators could literally handpitk 
and otherwise disqualify, or at least attempt so to do. 
undesirable potential jurors. 
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Returning to the case at bar, if this Court rules 
that the registers should be made public there would 
then exist the real possibility that appointment and 
promotion of deputy sheriffs would once again be made 
011 a patronage and political basis. The appointing au-
thority could continue to give lip service to a merit sys-
tem by inventing reasons for by-passing men standing 
higher on the appropriate register. 
The third argument of appellants it is submitted 
to justify this court reversing the order of the court 
below is that the Merit System Commission itself has 
a fiduciary duty to maintain the confidence of the deputy 
sheriffs and applicants themselves. That is, it is rea-
sonable to suppose that some Merit System officer, eli-
gihle to take the promotional exam, for example, may 
ha1'e some considerable hesitancy so to do if he were 
u\\'are that his ultimate standing as a result of the exam 
is to become public knowledge. It would seem mani-
festly unfair to all deputies that they on the one hand 
,J10ukl be informed that the results of their examina-
tion, the test scores themselves, are confidential, while 
at the same time allowing the resulting registers pre-
pared therefrom to be made public so that their rela-
ti1'e standing with regards to other deputies taking the 
exam is known but the exact number on the test is con-
fidential. Appellants in the past have refused to take 
such a stand. Indeed, they have felt it incumbent as a 
duty upon them to keep the registers as well as the 
r-xaminations scores confidential. They consider the 
duty imposed upon them by the terms of Section 17-30-23, 
11liirh in part provides: 
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''It shall be the duty of the Merit ServicP 
Commission to provide by rule for the operatio11 
and functioning of any activity within the pur. 
pose and spirit of the act which may be or ma1 
become necessary and proper and which is 
specifcally provided hereby.'' (emphasis added) 
Finally, it is again to be emphasized as is alleged 
in the uncontroverted Response for Request of Admis-
sions certified by the chairman of the Merit System Com. 
mission, which for the purpose of this appeal must be 
accepted as an admitted fact, as follows: 
'' Affiant specifically alleges that each and 
every deputy sheriff whose name appears on any 
register in the custody of the Merit Commission 
is free upon personal inquiry to ascertain his 
standing on said register and to inspect the con-
tents of his file kept at the office of said Com-
mission. Many such deputy sheriffs have so ill-
quired and been so informed and the Commission 
will continue to make available such records on 
an individual basis to the deputies concerned.'' 
(R. 15 and 16) 
CONCLUSION 
In Conclusion, therefore, appellants submit that the 
registers in question are not public documents because: 
1. The principle component i.e. competitive exam-
ination results are expressly not public docu-
ments. 
2. To rule the registers public documents woul,I 
frustrate the basic intent and purposes of the 
.Merit Systems Act. 
14 
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3. It may well have an effect of discouraging offi-
cers otherwise qualified for promotion from sub-
mitting to examination therefor for fear of some 
public embarrassment. 
For the foregoing reasons appellants respectfully 
request that the decisions of the district court be re-
versed and that the registers in question be declared not 
public documents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
MADSEN, UNO & CUMMINGS 
320 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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